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a b s t r a c t
In this paper, we introduce a new approach to independent quantifiers, as originally
introduced in Informational independence as a semantic phenomenon by Hintikka and
Sandu (1989) [9] under the header of independence-friendly (IF) languages. Unlike other
approaches, which rely heavily on compositional methods, we shall analyze independent
quantifiers via equilibriums in strategic games. In this approach, coined equilibrium
semantics, the value of an IF sentence on a particular structure is determined by the
expected utility of the existential player in any of the game’s equilibriums. This approach
was suggested inHenkin quantifiers and complete problems by Blass and Gurevich (1986) [2]
but has not been taken up before. We prove that each rational number can be realized by
an IF sentence. We also give a lower and upper bound on the expressive power of IF logic
under equilibrium semantics.
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Independence-friendly logic (IF logic), the logic with the slashed quantifiers (∃x/W ) and (∀x/W )was primarily [9] given
a game-theoretic semantics in terms of games of imperfect information. Let us introduce it by way of an example. Consider
the following simple game played by two players, Abelard (the universal player) and Eloise (the existential player): Abelard
hides 1 euro in his left or right hand, without Eloise’s seeing it. Eloise has to guess where it is. If she does, she wins and
Abelard loses; otherwise Abelard wins and Eloise loses.
Wemodel this game by fixing a structureMwith universeM = {l, r} and a sentence of IF logic ϕ given by ∀x(∃y/{x})x =
y. ϕ is interpreted by a semantic game G(M, ϕ), which has two moves: Abelard chooses an individual a ∈ M , after which
Eloise chooses b ∈ M , without ‘‘seeing’’ the individual chosen earlier by her opponent. The game stops: if a = b, Eloise wins
and Abelard loses; otherwise Abelard wins and Eloise loses. Notice how the syntax of the sentence indicates the patterns of
knowledge of the players in the semantic game.
What matters in a game is not winning a particular play but having a systematic method, a strategy, which gets a player
a win no matter what his or her opponent does. More exactly, a strategy for a player is represented by a set of functions,
one for each of his or her moves, defined on all the possible earlier sequences of ‘‘known’’ or ‘‘seen’’ elements at that move.
In our particular game, a strategy for Abelard is any individual inM and so is a strategy for Eloise. Were Eloise to know the
earlier move of her opponent, the sentence of the gamewould have been the ordinary first-order sentence ∀x∃y(x = y) and
the game itself would have been one of perfect information: in that case, a strategy for Abelard would be any individual in
M , while a strategy for Eloise would be any function f : M → M .
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It is well known that imperfect information introduces indeterminacy in the game. In fact, the game in our example is
the simplest indeterminate game: Neither Abelard nor Eloise has a winning strategy in it. Abelard has one if and only if
∃a∀b(a 6= b), which is impossible; and Eloise has one if and only if ∃b∀a(a = b), which is also impossible.
The semantic game described here is a game in extensive form. It provides a game-theoretic semantics for IF languages.
In [10], Hodges replaces game-theoretic semantics with a compositional interpretation (‘‘trump semantics’’) which is a
generalization of the Tarski-type semantics. His work has stimulated a host of similar interpretations, all of which sacrifice
the game-theoretic interpretation for compositional methods. Recent work by Väänänen [18], also inspired by Hodges’
trump semantics, abandons slash quantifiers altogether in favor of basic dependence relations between variables (cf. below).
For us, the replacement of the original game-theoretic interpretation with compositional methods is a symptom of the
fact that the former was not sufficiently exploited. In the present paper, we shall stick to the game-theoretic paradigm and
push it much further than was done before, by studying games for IF logic in strategic form. This approach was suggested in
[2], but has not been taken up since. The central concept of our approach is that of strategic equilibria (instead of winning
strategies). One of its interesting aspects is the emergence of amulti-valued semantics with truth values in the interval [0,1].
In Section 2, we introduce the syntax of IF logic, together with its Skolem semantics, which is supposed to be the
counterpart of the game-theoretic semantics sketched above. Section 3 gives a brief account of Väänänen’s dependence
logic together with few observations concerning the comparison between the two frameworks. Section 4 introduces IF
games in strategic form, together with the appropriate notion of equilibrium that will be used to define the truth value of an
IF sentence on a given structure. An easy example shows that there is an IF sentence that has the value 1/n, where n is the size
of the structure on which the given sentence is evaluated. The resulting concept of truth induces a new semantic relation
|Hε coined ‘‘equilibrium semantics’’. In Section 5, we give a more elaborate example which shows how to establish the
truth value of an IF sentence under the equilibrium semantics by the technique of eliminating weakly dominated strategies.
In Section 6, we show that, for every rational q ∈ [0, 1], there is an IF sentence that has truth value q regardless of the
structure. We use this result to derive some interesting properties of the equilibrium semantics. Section 7 gives a lower
and upper bound on the expressive power of IF logic under equilibrium semantics by drawing on insights from descriptive
complexity theory and combinatorial game theory. Section 8 concludes the paper.
2. Syntax and semantics: IF logic
In this section, we give a short introduction to the syntax and semantics of IF logic. It has been designed to represent
patterns of dependent and independent quantifiers that extend far beyond those possible in the Frege–Tarski linear tradition.
We fix a vocabulary L = {c1, c2, . . . , R1, R2, . . .}, that is, a collection of individual constants ci and relation symbols Ri.
An L-term is a first-order variable (usually denoted by xi, yi, zi, etc.) or a constant ci. The main novelty in the syntax is the
presence of slashed quantifiers (Qx/W ). The first definition introduces the notion of ‘‘pseudo-formula’’, that is, an IF formula
in which the slashed quantifiers are quite arbitrary.
Definition 1. The pseudo-formulas of IF logic in the vocabulary L (L-pseudo-formulas) are generated by the following rules:
ϕ ::= R(t1, . . . , tn) | ¬R(t1, . . . , tn) | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | (∃x/W )ϕ | (∀x/W )ϕ,
where R ∈ L, t1, . . . , tn are L-terms, andW is a finite set of variables.
W is called a ‘‘slash-set". The intended interpretation of (∃x/W ) is: there exists an x independent of the quantifiers which
binds the variables inW . The intended meaning of (∀x/W ) is similar.
The first-order notions of subformula and scope (i.e. a quantifier being superordinate to a subformula) are readily
generalized to pseudo-formulas of IF logic. Let x be a variable in the pseudo-formulaϕ that occurs either inψ = R(t1, . . . , tn)
or in the set W (where ψ = (Qy/W )θ). Let (Qz/U) be a quantifier in ϕ. We say that x is bound by (Qz/U) if (Qz/U) is
superordinate to ψ in ϕ and z = x. We say that x is bound if x is bound by one or more quantifiers. A free variable in ϕ is a
variable that is not bound in ϕ.
Definition 2. Let ϕ be an L-pseudo-formula of IF logic. Then ϕ is a formula of IF logic in the vocabulary L (L-IF formula or
simply IF formula) if it meets the following conditions:
• each variable x that appears in R(t1, . . . , tn) in ϕ is bound by at most one quantifier;
• each variable x that appears in a slash-setW in ϕ is bound by one quantifier;
• each quantifier (Qx/W ) in ϕ is such that x /∈ W .
Every pseudo-formula is an IF formula, but the converse is not true. An IF sentence is an IF formula with no free
variables. Thus (∃y/{x})R(x, y, z) is a pseudo-formula; ∀x(∃y/{x})R(x, y, z) is an IF formula; and ∀x(∃y/{x})∀zR(x, y, z) is
an IF sentence.
Truth is defined only for IF formulas ϕ and is given via skolemization, that is, a translation procedure that associates with
each subformula ψ of ϕ a formula Sk(ψ) in the language L∗ : the extension of Lwith new function symbols.
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Definition 3. Let ϕ be an L-formula of IF logic. The skolemized form or skolemization of ϕ is given by the following clauses:
Sk(ψ) = ψ , for ψ an atomic subformula or its negation
Sk(ψ ◦ θ) = Sk(ψ) ◦ Sk(θ), for ◦ ∈ {∨,∧}
Sk(∀x/W )ψ) = ∀xSk(ψ)
Sk(∃x/W )ψ) = Subst(Sk(ψ), x, fx(zk+1, . . . , zl)),
where W = {z1, . . . , zk}; (Q1z1/W1), . . . , (Qkzk/Wk), (Qk+1zk+1/Wk+1), . . . , (Qlzl/Wl) are all the quantifiers in the scope
of which (∃x/{z1, . . . , zk}) occurs, and fx is a new function symbol not contained in L. Subst denotes the usual substitution
operation.
A note on syntax: One of the reviewers remarks that the slash-sets in universal quantifiers are superfluous, since they
do not affect the truth conditions of a formula (cf. the skolemization clause for formulas (∀x/W )ψ). He or she suggests that
we exclude them from the syntax of IF logic. Here we remark that, even though removing the universal slash-sets from an
IF formula does not affect its truth value (true or untrue) under Skolem semantics, it may affect its truth value (a value in
[0, 1]) in the strategic framework developed below.
The functions fx, . . . in L∗ are called Skolem functions.
To take an example, consider the IF sentence ϕ:
∀x∀y(∃u/{y})(∃v/{x})ψ(x, y, u, v),
where ψ(x, y, u, v) is a quantifier-free first-order formula. Its skolemized form is obtained through the following steps:
Sk((∃v/x)ψ(x, y, u, v)) = ψ(x, y, u, fv(y, u))
Sk((∃u/{y})(∃v/{x})ψ(x, y, u, v)) = ψ(x, y, fu(x), fv(y, fu(x)))
Sk(ϕ) = ∀x∀yψ(x, y, fu(x), fv(y, fu(x))).
The vocabulary L = {c1, c2, . . . , R1, R2, . . .} receives an interpretation through an L-structure M = (M, cM1 , cM2 , . . . ,
RM1 , R
M
2 , . . .) in the usual way. We are now ready for the truth definition.
Definition 4. Let ϕ be an L-sentence of IF logic andM an L-structure. Then we stipulate that ϕ is true inM if and only if
there exist functions fMx1 , . . . , f
M
xn such thatM, f
M
x1 , . . . , f
M
xn |H Sk(ϕ), where fx1 , . . . , fxn are the function symbols in Sk(ϕ). If
ϕ is true inM,we writeM |H+ ϕ.
The more general notion of satisfaction of IF formulas is defined relative to an assignment in the usual way, but that
notion is not of interest to this paper.
Obviously for every IF sentence ϕ and structureMwe have:
M |H+ ϕ iff M |H ∃fx1 . . . ∃fxnSk(ϕ),
where fx1 , . . . , fxn are the new function symbols in Sk(ϕ).
Thus every IF sentence is equivalent to an existential second-order (Σ11 ) sentence. The converse follows from the theory
of Henkin quantifiers [20]: every Σ11 sentence is equivalent to an IF sentence. Thereby, IF logic inherits automatically the
model-theoretic properties of the Σ11 logic: the compactness theorem and the Löwenheim–Skolem theorem. IF logic also
defines its own truth-predicate, as shown by the second author in the Appendix of [8].
In order to deal with falsity, we can define another translation procedure, Kr (from Kreisel counter-examples), on IF
formulas that first replaces all occurrences of R(t1, . . . , tn) by ¬R(t1, . . . , tn); all disjunctions with conjunctions and vice
versa; all existential quantifier symbols ∃with universal quantifier symbols ∀ and vice versa; and, then applies Sk(·) to the
result. The reader may check that Kr(∀x(∃y/{x})x = y) = Sk(∃x(∀y/{x})x 6= y) = ∀y(fx 6= y), where fx is a 0-ary function
symbol.
By analogy with truth, we stipulate that an IF sentence ϕ is false in a structure M if and only if there exist functions
gMy1 , . . . , g
M
ym such thatM, g
M
y1 , . . . , g
M
ym |H Kr(ϕ), where gMy1 , . . . , gMym are the function symbols in Kr(ϕ). If ϕ is false inMwe
shall writeM |H− ϕ. Thus,
M |H− ϕ iff M |H ∃gy1 . . . ∃gynKr(ϕ).
Let us return to our earlier ϕ = ∀x(∃y/{x})x = y.We have
M |H+ ϕ iff M |H ∃y∀x(x = y)
M |H− ϕ iff M |H ∃x∀y(x 6= y)
and thereby neitherM |H+ ϕ norM |H− ϕ in every structureMwhich has more than one element.
Since both the truth and the falsity of an IF first-order sentence are definable byΣ11 sentences, IF logic also inherits from
Σ11 logic a Separation Theorem: If K1 and K2 are two disjoint classes of structures, each definable by an IF sentence, then
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there is an an elementary class (i.e. definable by a first-order sentence) which separates them. Burgess [3] shows how in
certain conditions, the separating first-order sentence can be effectively found.
We can easily generalize the game-theoretic semantics (games in extensive form) from the first section to provide an
alternative semantic interpretation for IF sentences, as specified in the present section: (slashed) existential quantifiers
and disjunctions promptmoves by Eloise; (slashed) universal quantifiers and conjunctions promptmoves by Abelard. Truth
(falsity) in a given structure is defined as the existence of a winning strategy for Eloise (Abelard). The reader should convince
herself that the existence of the appropriate Skolem functions in Skolem semantics yields awinning strategy for Eloise in the
corresponding semantic game of imperfect information, and vice versa. And similarly for the Kreisel counter-examples: they
exist if and only if Abelard has a winning strategy in the corresponding semantical game. In other words, game-theoretic
semantics and the Skolem semantics given in terms of Skolem functions and Kreisel counter-examples coincide.
3. Alternative frameworks
Väänänen [18], Väänänen and Hodges [19] and Abramsky and Väänänen [1] replace the dependence and independence
of quantifiers with dependence of terms. In this notation, the sentence ∃w∀x∃y(∃z/{x})(x = z ∧ w 6= y) is rendered as
∃w∀x∃y∃z(=(w, y, z) ∧ x = z ∧w 6= y). The new element is the atomic formula ‘‘=(w, y, z)’’ called a dependence formula.
More generally, the new syntax contains an infinite number of atomic formulas of the form
=(x1, . . . , xn−1, xn),
which, for n ≥ 2, have the intended interpretation
xn is functionally determined by x1, . . . , xn−1.
The resulting logic (i.e. first-order logic plus the dependence formulas) is called dependence logic (D logic). The semantics
follows the compositional semantics in [10]. It generalizes Tarski’s semantics by interpreting D formulas on sets of
assignments (trump semantics).We shall not enter into details here. Suffice it to give the semantic clause for the dependence
formulas. The set X of assignments satisfies the dependence formula =(x1, . . . , xn−1, xn) if and only if, for every two
assignments s, s′ ∈ X ,
if s and s′ agree on x1, . . . , xn−1, then s(xn) = s′(xn).
For sentences, IF logic and D logic are intertranslatable into each other. Perhaps the simplest way to see this is the
following. D logic has a prenex normal form theorem. It is shown in [18] that every D sentence is equivalent (up to truth) to
a sentence of the form
∀x1 . . . ∀xn∃y1 . . . ∃ymθ,
where θ is a conjunction of dependence formulas and of a quantifier-free first-order formula. Analogously, every IF sentence
is logically equivalent (up to truth) to a sentence of the form
∀x1 . . . ∀xk(∃xk+1/Wk+1) . . . (∃xk+n/Wk+n)ψ
where ψ is a quantifier-free first-order formula (see, e.g. [4]).
But now it is straightforward to see how the translation operates back and forth between IF and D sentences: Erase the
sets Wk+1, . . . ,Wk+n and add the appropriate dependence formulas to ψ . In the other direction, delete the dependence
formulas and express the dependences as slashed variables of the appropriate existential quantifiers.
The equivalence of expressive power notwithstanding, the two logical systems are designed to serve different purposes.
Dependence logic fits much better with the ideology of compositional semantics and recursive definitions. It is meant to
capture Armstrong’s notion of functional dependence in databases. IF logic and its game-theoretic interpretation, on the
other side, reflect much better the phenomena of signaling, which typically occur in games of imperfect information.
The classics of game theory observe that signaling is any convention of playwhereby one partner informs the others of his
holdings or desires. Von Neumann and Morgenstern observe that it occurs in Whist and Bridge. Hodges remarks: ‘‘In these
games there are two players and each of the players consists of two partners. . . . In general a pair of partners knows different
things about the state of the play but one of them can use his public moves to signal information about the other partner.’’
([10], p. 549). In [10] Hodges extensively connects IF logic with signaling in game theory. One example will suffice: compare
our earlier IF sentence ∀x(∃y/{x})x = ywith the IF sentenceψ that is given by ∀x∃z(∃y/{x})x = y. Unlike the former, which
is neither true nor false in all structureswith at least two elements, the latter is a logical truth. In this case, we can think of the
existential player as consisting of two partners: a Sender and a Receiver. The Sender sees the choices of the universal player
and ‘‘signals’’ them to his partner; the Receiver does not see the choices of the universal player but ‘‘copies’’ the moves of
her partner. In terms of Skolem functions, the truth ofψ is witnessed by the choice functions fsender = freceiver = IdM where
IdM is the identity function on the structureM at hand. This sort of ‘‘signalling games’’ are well known in the philosophical
literature and have been used by Lewis to give an account of conventional meaning.
In this paper, we pursue the game-theoretic interpretation of IF languages, but we shall push it in a completely different
direction than that existing in the literature. The strategies of Eloise and Abelard in semantic (extensive) games of imperfect
information are only the starting point. The notions of truth and falsity they define in the relevant semantic games, will turn
out to be limit cases of semantic values which arise out of solution concepts in strategic game theory (Nash equilibria).
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4. Equilibrium semantics
In this section, we formalize the framework that is suggested in [2] to handle indeterminateness of formulas with Henkin
quantifiers. The semantics of a particular class of generalized quantifiers was studied in terms of strategic games in [17]. We
learned, after submission, that Galliani [7] has proposed a strategic approach to IF logic (see also our discussion in Section 8),
which is close but quite different from the system alluded to in the following quote and the system developed in this paper.
‘‘. . . a formula might neither hold nor fail; that is, there might be no winning strategy for either player.
The simplest example of this phenomenon is given by(∀x
∃y
)
x = y
in any structure with at least two elements. Although unpleasant, this lack of determinacy should not be viewed as
pathological; it is the usual situation for games of imperfect information.
Miklos Ajtai has suggested applying the von Neumann minimax theorem to these games. . . . [In this approach,
f]ormulas which neither hold nor fail have intermediate truth values; the example(∀x
∃y
)
x = y
has truth value 1/n in structures of cardinality n.’’ [2]
We start out with some preliminary definitions from game theory.
Definition 5. Let N = {0, 1} be a set of two players. For i ∈ N , let Si be the set of strategies of player i. For i ∈ N , let
ui : S0 × S1 → R be a utility function for player i. Then, Γ = ((Si)i∈N , (ui)i∈N) is called a strategic game.
The size of Γ is given by n0 · n1, where ni = |Si|. Γ is finite, if it has finite size.
We shall be interested in the strategic games that are defined by IF sentences.
Definition 6. LetM be a structure and let ϕ be an IF sentence. Let G(M, ϕ) be the extensive game determined byM and ϕ.
Then, Γ (M, ϕ) = ((Si)i∈N , (ui)i∈N) is the strategic IF game ofM and ϕ, where
• N = {∃,∀} is the set of players;
• Si is the set of strategies of player i in G(M, ϕ);
• ui is the utility function of player i, s.t. ui(s, t) = 1 if playing s against t in G(M, ϕ) yields awin for player i and ui(s, t) = 0
otherwise.
Strategic IF games have the following two properties:
• Win–loss—Every game has only two outcomes, namely 0 and 1.
• Constant-sum—There is a constant c , s.t. for every s ∈ S∃ and t ∈ S∀, u∃(s, t) + u∀(s, t) = c. For strategic IF games, c
equals 1.1
Since strategic IF games Γ are constant-sum, the utility of Abelard is determined by Eloise’s utility. For succinctness we
shall thereforewriteΓ as ((Si)i∈N , u), where u refers to Eloise’s utility function u∃. Sometimeswemaywrite (S, T , u) instead
of (S∃, S∀, u).
The value of a strategic IF game ((Si)i∈N , u) will be defined in terms of its equilibrium pairs of mixed strategies. A mixed
strategy σi for player i is a probability distribution over Si. That is, σi is a function Si → [0, 1] such that∑s∈Si σi(s) = 1. A
mixed strategy σi : Si → {0, 1} is uniform over S ′i ⊆ Si if it assigns equal probability to all strategies in S ′i and zero probability
to the strategies in Si − S ′i . Given a mixed strategy σ for Eloise and a mixed strategy τ for Abelard, the expected utility for
player i is given by
Ui(σ , τ ) =
∑
s∈S∃
∑
t∈S∀
σ(s)τ (t)ui(s, t).
In line with our earlier convention, we write U for U∃.
Definition 7. LetN = {0, 1} andΓ = ((Si)i∈N , u)be a constant-sum, strategic game. Let (σ0, σ1)be apair ofmixed strategies
in Γ . Then, (σ0, σ1) is an equilibrium in Γ , if
• for every mixed strategy σ ′0, U0(σ0, σ1) ≥ U0(σ ′0, σ1); and• for every mixed strategy σ ′1, U1(σ0, σ1) ≥ U1(σ0, σ ′1).
1 One of the reviewers suggests to consider utility functions ui with range−1 and 1. If we did so, IF games would be ‘‘zero-sum’’ games. We prefer the
present formulation, since falsehood of a formula is typically associated with the value 0.
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The notion of equilibriumdefines a relation V between strategic IF gamesΓ and values v in the interval [0, 1]: (Γ , v) ∈ V
iff there is an equilibrium (σ0, σ1) in Γ s.t. U(σ0, σ1) = v. To show that V is in fact functional for finite Γ , first observe that
every finite, constant-sum, two-player game has an equilibrium in mixed strategies. This is von Neumann’s well-known
Minimax Theorem (cf. Theorem 28). Moreover, it is well known [14, p. 22] that every two equilibria in constant-sum, two-
player games have the same expected utility. It follows that V is functional. This leads us to the next definition.
Definition 8. Let ϕ be an IF sentence in the vocabulary L and letM be a finite L-structure. Then, V (Γ ) is the truth value of ϕ
onM, where Γ = Γ (M, ϕ).
It is important to notice that the framework set up in this paper concerns only finite structures. It is not trivial to generalize
the framework to infinite structures, since infinite games may not have an equilibrium.
Consider (the IF version of) Ajtai’s sentence ϕ = ∀x(∃y/x)x = y and some structureMwith, say, five objects a1, . . . , a5.
Both Abelard and Eloise have five strategies in Γ (M, ϕ) = (S, T , u): S = {sa : a ∈ M} and T = {ta : a ∈ M}. The utility
function u is conveniently depicted by the following matrix:
ta1 ta2 ta3 ta4 ta5
sa1 1 0 0 0 0
sa2 0 1 0 0 0
sa3 0 0 1 0 0
sa4 0 0 0 1 0
sa5 0 0 0 0 1
Let σ (resp. τ ) be the uniform strategy over S (resp. T ). It is easy to show that (σ , τ ) is an equilibrium with value 1/5.
So, interestingly, as the size ofM increases, the truth value of ϕ onM asymptotically approaches falsehood.
Definition 9. Let 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1. Let ϕ be an IF sentence in the vocabulary L and let M be a finite L-structure. We define
the satisfaction relation |Hε by M |Hε ϕ iff V (Γ ) ≥ ε, where Γ = Γ (M, ϕ). We call the semantics defined by |Hε the
‘‘equilibrium semantics’’ for IF logic.
The reader may have noted the asymmetry in the definition of |Hε between truth (greater than or equal to ε) and falsity
(smaller than ε). We shall see in Corollary 20 that this asymmetry evaporates in the face of nonrational ε. A convenient
property of the ‘‘inclusive’’ formulation of equilibrium semantics is that it is a ‘‘conservative extension’’ of Skolem semantics
and GTS.
Proposition 10. LetM be a finite structure and let ϕ be an IF sentence. Then, for ε = 1,M |Hε ϕ iffM |H+ ϕ.
To prove Proposition 10 one can exploit the fact that for ε = 1, finding an equilibrium coincides with finding a winning
strategy.
5. Evaluating a sentence by eliminating strategies
Several notions and techniques have been laid down to analyze strategic games. In this section, we will compute the
truth value of a particular IF sentence by removing ‘‘weakly dominated strategies’’ from the game. This procedure is well
known from the game-theoretic literature.
We will consider an IF sentence ϕeven on finite circular graphs. A directed graph C = (C, RC) is circular if there is an
ordering a0, . . . , an−1 of the elements in C such that RC is given by {(a0, a1), . . . , (an−2, an−1), (an−1, a0)}. In circular graphs,
the edge relation is functional. We shall thus sometimes write RC(a) for the R-successor of the object a. Assume that C
contains at least three elements.
A coloring of a graph C is a function f that sends the objects in C to one of two color objects c0, c1 ∈ C . The color objects
c0 and c1 reside within the graph and f also sends the color objects ci to color object f (ci) that need not be ci itself.
Clearly, a circular graph C has even cardinality iff C has a coloring f such that for each a ∈ C , f (a) 6= f (RC(a)). It is evident
that this property is expressed by theΣ11 sentence ∃f ∀x∀y(R(x, y)→ f (x) 6= f (y)). To mimick the second-order quantifier
∃f in IF logic we need two existential quantifiers. This is accomplished by the IF sentence ϕeven that is given by2
∀x(∀y/{x})(∃z0/{x, y})(∃z1/{x, y, z1})(∃u/{y, z0, z1})(∃v/{x, z0, z1})ψ,
where ψ consists of three conjuncts:
(u = z0 ∨ u = z1) ∧ (x = y→ u = v) ∧ (R(x, y)→ u 6= v).
2 This sentence is truth equivalent to
ϕ′even = ∃z0∃z1∀x∀y(∃u/{y})(∃v/{x})ψ
and we are confident that the truth value of this sentence is equal to the truth value of ϕeven . However, for any given structure with size two or greater,
each player has many more strategies in the corresponding strategic game of ϕ′even than in that of ϕeven . It will make the analysis more transparent if we
consider ϕeven .
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The skolemization of ϕeven reads3 ∃f ∃g∃z0∃z1∀x∀ySk(ψ), where Sk(ψ) is
(f (x) = z0 ∨ f (x) = z1) ∧ (x = y→ f (x) = g(y)) ∧ (R(x, y)→ f (x) 6= g(y)). (1)
The conjunct (x = y→ f (x) = g(y)) enforces that f and g be given the same interpretation. We leave it as an exercise to
the reader to check that ϕeven defines evenness on the class of circular graphs.
Write Γ = (S, T , u) for the strategic game of ϕeven on the circular graph Cwith odd size n. In this section wewill produce
a game-theoretic argument showing that the value of Γ is (1− 12n ). The argument builds on the insight that we can simplify
the game at hand by iteratively removing ‘‘weakly dominated’’ and ‘‘payoff equivalent’’ strategies.
Definition 11. Let Γ = (S0, S1, u0, u1) be a strategic game. We say that the strategy s0 ∈ S0 is weakly dominated by the
strategy s′0 ∈ S0, if
• u0(s0, s1) ≤ u0(s′0, s1), for every s1 ∈ S1;• u0(s0, s1) < u0(s′0, s1), for some s1 ∈ S1;
and likewise for strategies s′1 ∈ S1 of player 1. The strategy si ∈ Si is weakly dominated in Γ if there is a strategy s′i ∈ Si such
that si is weakly dominated by s′i .
Definition 12. Let Γ = (S0, S1, u) be a constant-sum game and let s0, s′0 ∈ S0. We say that s0 and s′0 are payoff equivalent in
Γ if u(s0, s1) = u(s′0, s1), for each s1 ∈ S1; likewise for the strategies of player 1.
Proposition 13. Let Γ = (S0, S1, u) be a finite, constant-sum game. Then, Γ has a mixed strategy equilibrium (σ0, σ1) such that
for each player i and each pure strategy s ∈ Si of player i, if σi(s) > 0 then
• s is not weakly dominated in Γ and
• s does not have a payoff equivalent strategy in Γ .
Proof. For the first item see [13] (this proof requires finiteness of the game). The second item is easy. 
Proposition 13 grants us that we can remove the discussed strategies from the game without affecting the game’s value.
For instance, let s ∈ S0 be a strategy that is weakly dominated or that has a payoff equivalent in the finite constant-sum
game (S0, S1, u). Then, by Proposition 13 there is an equilibrium (σ0, σ1) for which σ0 assigns zero probability to s. But then,
(S0−{s}, S1, u) has (σ0, σ1) as an equilibriumwith value equal to the value of the initial game. Note that, formally speaking,
we should consider, as utility function in (S0 − {s}, S1, u), the restriction of u to the remaining strategy pairs in this game,
but we shall be sloppy in this respect and simply write u.
The strategic IF game Γ = Γ (C, ϕeven) is quite a large beast: Abelard has quadratically many strategies in n and Eloise
has an exponential number of strategies in n, where n is the size of C. The remainder of this section is dedicated to removing
weakly dominated and payoff equivalent strategies from Γ until we hit a subgame in which each player has 2n strategies.
We define two subsets S1 and S2 in S. Fact 16 below shows that every strategy in S that does not sit in S1 ∪ S2 is weakly
dominated by a strategy in S1 ∪ S2.
Notation 14. A strategy s for Eloise (resp. Abelard) in an extensive or strategic IF game can be considered as a series of choice
functions sψ , where ψ ranges over the subformulas owned by Eloise (resp. Abelard). Let ψ = (Qx/W )χ . When proving that
Skolem semantics coincides with GTS, one exploits the fact that there is a one-to-one correspondence between choice functions
sψ and Skolem functions gψ that interpret the function symbol fψ : each choice function sψ defines a Skolem function gψ and vice
versa.
Throughout this section, we write f sψ to denote the Skolem function gψ that is defined by the choice function sψ . We shall also
use the shorthand notation (M, s) for (M, (f sψ )ψ ), where ψ ranges over the subformulas owned by Eloise (Abelard), to indicate
that we ‘‘extend’’ the structureM by the strategy s.
Fix two color objects c0 6= c1 from C and let Ec = (c0, c1). For objects a and b = RC(a), let hab,Ec be the coloring that can be
constructed as follows: first set hab,Ec(a) = hab,Ec(b) = z0. Then, for j = 0 . . . n − 3, starting from b, move from the current
object to its R-successor b′, increase j by one, and set hab,Ec(b′) = c0 if j is even and hab,Ec(b′) = z1 if j is odd. Notice that
hab,Ec sends only two adjacent objects to the same color, namely a and b. (2)
Let HEc1 be the set {hab,Ec : (a, b) ∈ RC}. Let S1 be the set of all strategies s = (zs0, zs1, f s, g s) such that zs0 6= zs1, f s = g s and
f s ∈ HEz1 , where Ez = (zs0, zs1).
For objects a and b = RC(a), let hb,Ec be the coloring that sends b to c1 and that is otherwise like hab,Ec . Let HEc2 be the set
{hb,Ec : b ∈ C }. Let S2 be the set of all strategies s = (zs0, zs1, f s, g s) such that zs0 6= zs1, f s = hab,Ez ∈ HEz1 and g s = hb,Ez ∈ HEz2 ,
where Ez = (zs0, zs1).
For an illustration of the functions in HEc1 and H
Ec
2 , see Fig. 1.
The following fact shows that the strategies in S1 and S2 lose against precisely one strategy in T in such a way that if
s ∈ S1 ∪ S2 loses against t ∈ T , then there is no other strategy in S1 ∪ S2 that loses against t .
3 We use the symbols z0, z1 also as nullary function symbols.
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Fig. 1.Depicted are the objects of a circular graphCwith five objects: a0, . . . , a4 .We have omitted the binary relation RC = {(a0, a1), . . . , (a3, a4), (a4, a0)}.
The two dedicated color objects c0 and c1 are depicted as if they existed on their own, even though ci ∈ {a0, . . . , a4}. Figure (a) shows function hab,Ec for
a = a1 and b = a2; Figure (b) shows function hb,Ec for b = a2 .
Fact 15. • Let s ∈ S1, let s = (zs0, zs1, f s, g s) and let a and b be the objects for which f s = g s = hab,Ez . Then, for every
t = (xt , yt) ∈ T , u(s, t) = 0 iff xt = a and yt = b.
• Let s ∈ S2, let s = (zs0, zs1, f s, g s) and let a and b be the objects for which f s = hab,Ez and g s = hb,Ez . Then, for every
t = (xt , yt) ∈ T , u(s, t) = 0 iff xt = yt = b.
Proof. Let s ∈ Si and t ∈ T . We have u(s, t) = 1 iff (C, s, t) |H Sk(ψ), where Sk(ψ) as in (1). Obviously, the first conjunct in
Sk(ψ) is satisfied since f s is a coloring by construction. The proofs of the two respective items continue as follows:
• Case s ∈ S1. Since f s = g s, the second conjunct is true regardless xt and yt . Therefore, u(s, t) = 0 iff the third conjunct in
Sk(ψ) fails, that is,
(C, f s, xt , yt) 6|H R(x, y)→ f (x) 6= f (y).
We saw in (2) that a function hab,Ez from HEz1 only sends a and b to the same color. So u(s, t) = 0 iff xt = a and yt = b. Note
that, since C is a directed graph in which (a, b) ∈ RC implies not (b, a) ∈ RC, playing s against the strategy t ′ with xt ′ = b
and yt
′ = a yields a win for Eloise.
• Case s ∈ S2. Consider three mutually exclusive cases:
Case xt 6= yt and (xt , yt) /∈ RC: u(s, t) = 1, because the second and third conjunct are automatically satisfied.
Case xt = yt : The third conjunct is automatically satisfied. It suffices to show that u(s, t) = 1 iff f s(xt) = g s(xt). By
construction, f s = hab,Ez and g s = hb,Ez disagree only on b. Hence, f s(xt) = g s(xt) iff xt 6= b.
Case (xt , yt) ∈ RC: We show that u(s, t) = 1. Since the second conjunct is automatically satisfied, it suffices to show
that f s(xt) 6= g s(yt). Recall that f s = hab,Ez and g s = hb,Ez . We distinguish three subcases. (i) Suppose xt = a and yt = b.
By construction, hab,Ez(a) = zs0 6= zs1 = hb,Ez(b). (ii) Suppose xt = b. By construction, hab,Ez(b) = zs0. The object yt is the
R-successor of xt , that is, the first object that is sent to zs1 whenwe construct the function hab,Ez . The function hb,Ez disagrees
with hab,Ez only on b. Therefore, hb,Ez(yt) = hab,Ez(yt) = zs1 and we are done. (iii) Suppose xt 6= a and xt 6= b. It follows that
also yt 6= b. As before, the function hb,Ez disagrees with hab,Ez only on b. Thus, hb,Ez(yt) = hab,Ez(yt). From (2) we derive that
hab,Ez(xt) 6= hab,Ez(yt). 
The following result allows us to remove all strategies that are not in S1 ∪ S2.
Fact 16. The value of Γ = (S, T , u) is equal to the value of (S1 ∪ S2, T , u).
Proof. We show that every strategy that is not in S1∪S2 is weakly dominated by or payoff equivalent to a strategy in S1∪S2.
Let s ∈ (S − (S1 ∪ S2)). Define Ls = {t ∈ T : u(s, t) = 0} and define Ns = |Ls|. We split the proof in three cases:
Case Ns = 0: It follows that s is a winning strategy and therefore ϕeven is true on C. Contradiction.
Before we proceed, observe that:
If there is an a such that f s(a) /∈ {zs0, zs1}, then {t ∈ T : xt = a} ⊆ Ls. (3)
Case Ns = 1: Let t be the single strategy from Ls. Since u(s, t) = 0, at least one of Sk(ψ)’s conjuncts fails on (C, s, t). It
cannot be the first conjunct. Suppose, for contradiction, that the structure (C, s, t) fails to make the first conjunct true. Then,
by (3), Ls contains at least n strategies, contradicting Ns = 1.
Suppose u(s, t) = 0 on account of (C, s, t) falsifying the second conjunct: (C, s, t) 6|H x = y→ f (x) = g(y). Then, xt = yt
but not f s(xt) = g s(yt). Consider the strategy s∗ ∈ S2 with f s∗ = hab,Ez and g s∗ = hb,Ez , where b = xt and Ez is any pair of
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distinct objects. From the second item of Fact 15, it follows that s∗ loses only against t , just like s. Hence, s and s∗ are payoff
equivalent.
Suppose u(s, t) = 0 on account of (C, s, t) falsifying the third conjunct: (C, s, t) 6|H R(x, y)→ f (x) 6= g(y). Then, yt is an
R-successor of xt but f s(xt) = g s(yt). Consider the strategy s∗ ∈ S1 with f s∗ = g s∗ = hab,Ez , where a = xt , b = yt and Ez is any
pair of distinct objects. Apply the first item of Fact 15 to show that s and s∗ are payoff equivalent.
Case Ns ≥ 2: It suffices to show that Ls contains at least one strategy t such that xt = yt or RC(xt) = yt . For suppose t ∈ Ls
with RC(xt) = yt . Consider the strategy s∗ ∈ S1 with f s∗ = g s∗ = hab,Ez , where xt = a, yt = b and Ez is any pair of distinct
objects. By the first item of Fact 15, s∗ only loses against t . Since s loses against t and at least one other strategy (Ns ≥ 2), s
is weakly dominated by s∗. Similarly for t ∈ Ls with xt = yt .
For the sake of contradiction, assume that Ls contains no strategy t for which xt = yt or RC(xt) = yt . Fix an arbitrary
strategy t ∈ Ls. Since t ∈ Ls, u(s, t) = 0, and thus the structure (C, s, t) automatically satisfies the second and third
conjunct, given that xt 6= yt and RC(xt) = yt . This structure falsifies the first conjunct and by (3), {t ∈ T : xt = a} ⊆ Ls. We
conclude that the strategy (xt , yt)with xt = yt = a is also contained in Ls. 
We shall remove some of Eloise’s strategies once more. Let Ec = (c0, c1) be any pair of distinct objects. Let SEci , i = 1, 2, be
the subset of Si that only has strategies swith functions f s and g s from HEz1 ∪ HEz2 , where zs0 = c0 and zs1 = c1.
Fact 17. The value of (S1 ∪ S2, T , u) is equal to the value of (SEc1 ∪ SEc2, T , u).
Proof. Let s ∈ SEd1 , where Ec 6= Ed. So s is not in SEc1 . Let a and b the objects for which f s = g s = hab,Ed. Consider the strategy s∗ in
SEc1 , for which f s
∗ = g s∗ = hab,Ec . The first item of Fact 15 implies that if Eloise plays either s or s∗, she only loses against the
strategy t with xt = a and yt = b. Hence, s and s∗ are payoff equivalent.
Likewise for s ∈ SEd2 . 
Each strategy in s ∈ (SEc1∪SEc2) assigns to the function symbols f and g proper colorings, that is, functionswith range {c0, c1}.
Thus, each play of the game in which Eloise plays such an s induces an interpretation of the logical symbols that satisfies the
first conjunct of Sk(ψ). Eloise playing a strategy from (SEz1 ∪ SEz2), the only way for Abelard to win a play is by choosing a pair
of objects that satisfies the antecedent of the second or third conjunct. Let T ′ = {t ∈ T : xt = yt or RC(xt) = yt}.
Fact 18. The value of (SEc1 ∪ SEc2, T , u) is equal to the value of (SEc1 ∪ SEc2, T ′, u).
Proof. Left as an exercise to the reader. 
Write Γ ∗ = (S∗, T ∗, u) for (SEc1 ∪ SEc2, T ′, u). SEc1 and SEc2 are the sets that contain for every object a one strategy hab,Ec and
one strategy hb,Ec , respectively, where b is the R-successor of a. Since SEc1 and S
Ec
2 do not overlap, S
∗ contains 2n strategies.
Similarly, T ∗ is the set that contains for each object a two strategies (xt , yt), where xt = a and yt is either equal to a or to a’s
R-successor. Hence, T ∗ has size 2n.
We can write u as a 2n× 2nmatrix, with a 0 in cell (s, t) if, for a = xt and b = yt , either of the two cases holds:
• a 6= b, f s = hab,Ez and g s = hab,Ez or
• a = b, f s = hab,Ez and g s = hb,Ez ;
and 1 otherwise. The matrix of u has a diagonal of 0s and is otherwise filled with 1s. It is easy to verify that the value of Γ ∗
equals (1− 12n ).
Computing the semantic value ofϕeven has unveiled several aspects of equilibrium semantics. In standard game-theoretic
semantics, emphasis is on winning strategies that guide its owner through the extensive game tree. According to one
favoured interpretation of strategic games, the players (randomly) select a strategy in parallel and hand them to a neutral
arbiter who processes the strategies and returns the outcome to the players. In the present setting, the arbiter receives the
best evidence that Eloise and Abelard can produce for their respective cases. If Eloise’s strategy is winning, her evidence
defies each of Abelard’s challenges. In the case of ϕeven a winning strategy would comprise a coloring that sends any pair of
adjacent objects to distinct colors. Things get more complex, and interesting, when neither Eloise nor Abelard has a winning
strategy. In that case, Eloise and Abelard draw strategies so as to maximize their respective expected utility.
It is probably worthwhile to note that, in the case of ϕeven, equilibrium semantics does not give a quantitative account of
truth. In a quantitative framework, the truth value of a sentence ϕ on a structureM is regarded as the ‘‘degree’’ to whichM
has property ϕ. From a quantitative point of view, a circular graph C of odd size n+ 2 would be ‘‘more even’’ than a circular
graph C′ of size n. It follows from this section’s analysis, namely, that the truth value of ϕeven is strictly higher on C than on
C′: (1− 12n+4 ) vs. (1− 12n ). We would say that this is an undesirable property of a quantitative interpretation for logic.
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6. Strategic IF games realize all rationals
It is known that the class of win–loss, two-player games whose utility function return only rationals realize precisely the
rationals [15, p. 739]. That is, (i) every win–loss game has a value in Q and (ii) for every q ∈ Q, there is a win–loss game
with value q. Even though the class of strategic IF games is only a subclass of the class of win–loss, two-player games, it can
be shown that they too realize precisely the rationals in [0, 1]. Item (i) of this claim follows from (i) for general win–loss,
two-player games. Item (ii) is implied by Theorem 19.
Theorem 19. Let 0 ≤ m < n be integers and q = m/n. There exists an IF sentence ζq that has truth value q on every structure
M with at least two objects.
Proof. We will first give an auxiliary game with value q, and then give its definition in IF. The second game proves the
theorem.
• Game—LetM be such that |M| ≥ n. Let C ⊆ M such that |C | = n. We describe a two-step game G1:
S1 Abelard picks upm objects b1, . . . , bm fromM;
S2 Eloise picks up one object c fromM , not knowing b1, . . . , bm.
Eloise gets pay-off 1 if and only if at least one of the following conditions is met for some 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m:
1. bi = bj (Abelard has chosen two identical objects);
2. bi /∈ C (Abelard has chosen outside C);
3. c = bi (Eloise guesses one of Abelard’s objects).
Conditions (1) and (2) force Abelard to chose m distinct objects from C . Note that there is no need to hardwire in the
winning conditions that Eloise choose c from C . Any strategy of Eloise that chooses c from outside C is weakly dominated
by every strategy that chooses c from C .
• Value—Let σ be Eloise’s uniformmixed strategy over {sa : a ∈ C}. LetB be the set of sets B for which B ⊆ C and |B| = m.
Let τ be Abelard’s uniform mixed strategy over {tB : B ∈ B}, where tB is a strategy that lets Abelard pick precisely the
objects in B in an arbitrary order. The pair (σ , τ ) is an equilibrium in G1 with valuem/n.
• Definition in IF—Assume thatM interprets the constant symbols c1, . . . , cn in such a way that C = {cM1 , . . . , cMn }.
Consider the IF sentence which defines G1:
∀x1(∀x2/{x1}) . . . (∀xm/{x1, . . . , xm−1})(∃y/{x1, . . . , xm}) β1 ∨ β2 ∨ β3,
where
β1 =
∨
i∈{1,...,m}
∨
j∈{1,...,m}−{i}
xi = xj
β2 =
∨
i∈{1,...,m}
∧
j∈{1,...,n}
xi 6= cj
β3 =
∨
i∈{1,...,m}
xi = y.
The slash-sets in the universal quantifiers reduce the set of Abelard’s strategies. The IF sentence that is obtained by
dropping the slash-sets in the universal quantifiers gives rise to a game in which Abelard picks an object for x1 and then
picks an object for x2 on the basis of x1, etc. This sentence has the same truth value as the above sentence, but it gives rise
to larger games, see also our discussion in Section 5.
The formulas β1–β3 encode the respective winning conditions (1)–(3) from G1 in first-order logic. The ignorance of
Eloise in S2 is codified by the slash.
The previous game assumes that |M| ≥ n and that we have n distinct objects at our disposal. We can drop both
assumptions by letting Eloise pick n objects from which Abelard has to chose, and by letting them draw long enough
‘‘bitstrings’’ that encode their choice. In this way, we only need two dedicated letters, which can also be chosen by Eloise. It
does not matter which two objects are chosen as letters, as long as they are distinct.
• Game—Let ` = d2 log ne.
S0′ Eloise picks up two (distinct) objects a0 and a1 fromM;
S1′ Eloise picks up ` · n objects Eb1, . . . , Ebn fromM;
S2′ Abelard picks up ` ·m objects Ec1, . . . , Ecm fromM;
S3′ Eloise picks up ` objects Ed fromM , not knowing Eb1, . . . , Ebm,
where Ebi abbreviates (b1i , . . . , b`i ), etc. Eloise gets pay-off 1 if and only if a0 6= a1, Eb1, . . . , Ebn, Ed ∈ A` and at least one of
the following conditions is met for some 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m:
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1. cki = ckj , for all 1 ≤ k ≤ ` (Abelard has chosen two equal bitstrings);
2. Eci /∈ {Eb1, . . . , Ebn} (one of Abelard’s bitstrings is not in {Eb1, . . . , Ebn});
3. cki = dk, for all 1 ≤ k ≤ ` (Eloise guesses one of Abelard’s bitstrings).
Let G2 be the game described by S0′–S3′ and the latter winning conditions.
• Value—It is readily observed that the value of G2 is mn .• Definition in IF—Consider the sentence ζq that is given by
∃z1(∃z2/{z1})(∃w11/W 11 ) . . . (∃w`1/W `1 ) . . . (∃w1n/W 1n ) . . . (∃w`n/W `n )
(∀x11/X11 ) . . . (∀x`1/X`1 ) . . . (∀x1m/X1m) . . . (∀x`m/X`m)
(∃y1/Y 1) . . . (∃y`/Y `) γ ,
where for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ m and 1 ≤ k ≤ `,
W ki = {z1, z2, Ew1, . . . , Ewi−1, w1i , . . . , wk−1i }
Xkj = {Ex1, . . . , Exj−1, x1j , . . . , xk−1j }
Y k = {z1, z2, Ew1, . . . , Ewn, Ex1, . . . , Exm, y1, . . . , yk−1}
and γ = (z1 6= z2 ∧ (γ1 ∨ γ2 ∨ γ3))with
γ1 =
∨
i∈{1,...,m}
∨
j∈{1,...,m}−{i}
(x1i = x1j ∧ · · · ∧ x`i = x`j )
γ2 =
∨
i∈{1,...,m}
∧
j∈{1,...,n}
(w1j 6= x1i ∨ · · · ∨ w`j 6= x`i )
γ3 =
∨
i∈{1,...,m}
(x1i = y1 ∧ · · · ∧ x`i = y`). 
Corollary 20. Let 0 < ε < 1 be nonrational. Then, the ‘‘inclusive’’ definition of equilibrium semantics from Definition 9 coincides
with its ‘‘exclusive’’ version, since V (Γ ) ≥ ε iff V (Γ ) > ε, for every strategic IF game Γ .
With the help of Theorem 19, we can show that the expressive power of IF logic is independent of the threshold value ε
under which we evaluate its sentences, given that ε is a rational and that 0 < ε < 1. This follows from Theorem 22. In the
proof of this result, we use the following helpful proposition.
Proposition 21. Let ϕ be an IF sentence and let 0 ≤ q ≤ 1 be a rational. Then,
1. there is an IF sentence ϕ′ s.t. for every structureM, V (Γ ′) = qV (Γ )+ (1− q);
2. there is an IF sentence ϕ′ s.t. for every structureM, V (Γ ′) = qV (Γ ),
where Γ = Γ (M, ϕ) and Γ ′ = Γ (M, ϕ′).
Proof. We give the rationale behind the first claim. Let v denote the value V (Γ ).
• Game—First, the game G2 from the proof of Theorem 19 is played until all quantifier moves have been handled. Then,
Eloise is shown all objects that have been chosen so far and she is offered the choice between (a) continuing the game of
G2 and (b) playing the game of ϕ onM (in a way that is unaffected by the previous moves).
• Value—Let us consider the moment in this game where Eloise is shown all objects chosen so far. Either (i) the selected
assignment satisfies γ (in which case Eloise would receive 1 if she would choose (a)) or (ii) the selected assignment
makes γ false (in which case Eloise gets nothing if she would choose (a)). If (i), Eloise chooses (a) since this results in
a guaranteed win for her. If (ii), she chooses (b) since the expected payoff of this choice is v. By the reasoning from the
proof of Theorem 19, the odds that (i) occurs is q and the odds that (ii) occurs is 1 − q. Hence, the value of this game is
q+ (1− q)v.
• Definition in IF—Let us write EQExγ for the sentence ζq from Theorem 19 and let us assume, without loss of generality, that
none of the variables in Ex appears in ϕ. The sentence EQEx(γ ∨ ϕ) defines the described game. The choice between (a) and
(b) is triggered by the disjunction in (γ ∨ ϕ).
The sentence EQEx(γ ∧ ϕ) bears witness to the second item in the same way. 
Theorem 22. Let 0 < ε, ε′ ≤ 1 be rationals s.t. if ε′ = 1 then ε = 1. Then, for every IF sentence ϕ in the vocabulary L there is
an IF sentence ϕ′ in the same vocabulary such thatM |Hε ϕ iffM |Hε′ ϕ′, for every L-structureM.
Proof. We distinguish two cases.
Case ε < ε′ < 1: Let q be the rational (ε′−1)/(ε−1). Let ϕ′ be an IF sentence for which V (Γ ′) = qV (Γ )+ (1−q), on all
M, where Γ = Γ (M, ϕ) and Γ ′ = Γ (M, ϕ′). Such a ϕ′ exists due to Proposition 21.1. An elementary algebraic argument
shows thatM |Hε ϕ iffM |Hε′ ϕ′.
Case ε > ε′: Let q be the rational ε′/ε. The sentence ϕ′ for which V (Γ ′) = qv(Γ ) does the job (Proposition 21.2). 
We will comment on the exception that ε′ = 1 imply ε = 1 below.
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7. Complexity of finding equilibria
In this section, we explore the expressive power of IF logic under equilibrium semantics for arbitrary 0 < ε < 1 by
drawing on descriptive complexity. In descriptive complexity (or finite model theory [11]), a logic is associated with the
class STR(ϕ) of finite structures in which ϕ is true, where ϕ ranges over the sentences of the logic at hand. In this framework,
Fagin [6] showed that NP = Σ11 , that is, every NP-soluble problem is definable in Σ11 and conversely, every Σ11 -definable
property is soluble in NP. Here, as above,Σ11 denotes the fragment of second-order logic with sentences ∃X1 . . . ∃Xnϕ with
ϕ first-order.
Definition 23. Let 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1. Let ϕ be an IF sentence. Define STRε(ϕ) as the set
{M :M |Hε ϕ andM is finite}.
Let IFε be the class of all STRε(ϕ), where ϕ ranges over the IF sentences.
Results in descriptive complexity enable us to approach the expressive power of IF under equilibrium semantics in terms
of the computational complexity of IFε .
Theorem 22 implies a lower bound on IFε .
Corollary 24. Let 0 < ε ≤ 1 be rational. Then, NP ⊆ IFε .
Proof. That NP = IF1 is implied by Fagin’s result, the fact that Σ11 coincides with IF logic qua expressive power and
Proposition 10. It follows from Theorem 22 that for every STR1(ϕ) ∈ IF1 there is a STRε(ϕ′) ∈ IFε for which STR1(ϕ) =
STRε(ϕ′). 
The converse direction (i.e. NP ⊇ IFε) does not follow from Theorem 22, since it does not cover the case in which
ε < ε′ = 1.ΣP2 is the complexity class of problems that are soluble by a nondeterministic polynomial-time Turing machine
ML that has access to an oracle that can be queried about the NP computable language L. An alternative way of writing ΣP2
is NPNP. The classΠP2 abbreviates coNP
NP. The classΣP2 ∩ΠP2 consists of the languages that are solvable inΣP2 and inΠP2 . In
descriptive complexity,Σ12 = ΣP2 , whereΣ12 is the fragment of second-order logic of the sentences ∃X1 . . . ∃Xm∀Y1 . . . ∀Ynϕ
with ϕ first-order. In the same sense, Π12 = ΠP2 . The remainder of this section is dedicated to the proof of the following
upper bound.
Theorem 25. Let 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1. Then, IFε ⊆ ΣP2 ∩ΠP2 .
Proof. Immediate from Lemmata 30 and 31. 
We prove Theorem 25 by analyzing an algorithm that computes the equilibrium for strategic IF games. Computing the
Nash equilibrium in two-player strategic games (possibly nonwin–loss and nonconstant-sum) was recently shown [5] to be
complete for the class PPAD, of which it is known that P ⊆ PPAD ⊆ NP. It is well known [16] that computing the value of
constant-sum games is in P.
Proposition 26. Let N = {0, 1}. Let Γ = ((Si)i∈N , u) be a finite, two-player, constant-sum strategic game. Then, computing the
value of Γ can be done in time polynomial in the size of Γ .
Proposition 26 does not settle the complexity for strategic games, since the size of the strategic IF game Γ (M, ϕ) is
exponential in the size of the input: the cardinality ofM.4 A result in [12] guarantuees that there exists a polynomial-sized
(or ‘‘polysized’’) subgame Γ ′ in Γ (M, ϕ) that has the same value as Γ (M, ϕ). (S ′, T ′, u) is a subgame in (S, T , u), if S ′1 ⊆ S1,
S ′2 ⊆ S2 and u′ is the restriction of u to S ′ × T ′. We shall simply write u for u′.
The support of a mixed strategy σ is the set of pure strategies to which σ assigns a nonzero probability. The following
result helps us find polysized subgames.
The result addresses games in their extensive form. In this form, a state in the game is modelled as a history, that is,
the list of moves that lead from the start of the game to the current situation. A terminal history is a history that cannot be
extended, i.e. that corresponds to a state in which the game terminates.
Theorem 27 ([12]). Let G be a finite, two-player, constant-sum game in extensive form. Let σ be a mixed strategy in G. Then,
there exists a mixed strategy σ ′ in G that is equivalent modulo utility to σ s.t. the support of σ ′ contains at most ` pure strategies,
where ` is the number of terminal histories in the game tree.
A history in an extensive IF game G = G(M, ϕ) can be seen as a list of operator-action pairs. The connectives ∨ and ∧
are accompanied by an action left or right, the quantifiers (∀x/W ) and (∃x/W ) are accompanied by an object fromM . Thus,
a history is a list of at most n pairs, where n is the length of ϕ. Suppose ϕ contains n0 connectives and n1 quantifiers. Then,
there are at most 2n0mn1 < mn many terminal histories in G, wherem is the cardinality ofM .
4 In descriptive complexity, we consider the computational problem of deciding whetherM ∈ STRε(ϕ). The size of the input is O(mc) for some constant
c , wherem the size ofM. Note that the size of ϕ, n, is a constant parameter in STRε(ϕ).
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Whence, if (σ , τ ) is an equilibrium in Γ = Γ (M, ϕ), then there is an equilibrium (σ ′, τ ′) s.t. S ′ (and T ′) is the support
of σ ′ (and τ ′) for which the size of S ′ (and T ′) is polynomial in m. It follows from Theorem 27 that the value of Γ coincides
with the value of its polysized subgame Γ ′ = (S ′, T ′, u). Theorem 27 does not tell us how to obtain Γ ′ from Γ . To this end,
we turn to von Neumann’s Minimax Theorem, see [14].
Theorem 28. Let Γ = (S, T , u) be a finite, two-player, constant-sum strategic game. Then,
V (Γ ) = max
σ
min
τ
U(σ , τ ) = min
τ
max
σ
U(σ , τ ),
where σ (resp. τ ) ranges over the mixed strategies in S (resp. T ).
We give a reformulation of Theorem 28 in terms of subgames.
Lemma 29. Let Γ = (S, T , u) be a finite, two-player, constant-sum strategic game with value v. Then,
1. there exists S ′ ⊆ S, s.t. for every T ′ ⊆ T , V (S ′, T ′, u) ≥ v;
2. there exists T ′ ⊆ T , s.t. for every S ′ ⊆ S, V (S ′, T ′, u) ≥ v.
Proof. Weprove the first item. By Theorem28,maxσ minτ U(σ , τ ) = v. Hence, there exists amixed strategyσ ∗maximizing
minτ U(σ ∗, τ ) = v. Let τ ∗ be the mixed strategy minimizing U(σ ∗, τ ∗). Then, for all mixed strategies τ ′ ∈ T , we have that
U(σ ∗, τ ′) ≥ v.
Let S∗ be the support of σ ∗. Then, V (S∗, T ′, u) ≥ v, where T ′ the support of any mixed strategy τ ′. 
Theorem 27 guarantees that we can restrict our attention in Lemma 29 to polysized sets S ′ and T ′. It is left as an exercise
to the reader to work out the equivalence between item (1) of Lemma 29 and its refinement (1′) by taking into account
Theorem 27:
1′. there exists polysized S ′ ⊆ S, s.t. for every polysized T ′ ⊆ T , V (S ′, T ′, u) ≥ v.
We are now ready to prove one part of Theorem 25.
Lemma 30. IFε ⊆ ΣP2 .
Proof. Consider the gameΓ = Γ (M, ϕ) = (S, T , u) and suppose its value is v. We need to decidewhether v ≥ ε. It follows
from (1′) that there exists a polysized S ′ ⊆ S, s.t. for every polynomial-sized T ′ ⊆ T , V (S ′, T ′, u) ≥ ε iffM ∈ STR(ϕ).
Since a pure strategy in Γ can be described in polynomial time in m, we can describe all pure strategies in polysized
subsets S ′ in polynomial time inm. Whence, an NP machine guesses a set S∗ for which V (S∗, T ′, u) ≥ v for all T ′, if such an
S∗ exists.
Given S∗, we query an NP oracle whether there exists a polysized set T ∗, for which the value v∗ of Γ ∗ = (S∗, T ∗, u∗) is
smaller than ε. That is, the oracle accepts iff v∗ < ε. We decide thatM ∈ STRε(ϕ) iff the oracle rejects.
To prove that the above is an NP query, we need to show that we can compute in polynomial time the value ofΓ ∗ from S∗
and T ∗. To this end, we first make the observation that u∗, i.e. the restriction of u to the strategy pairs in Γ ∗, can be written
out in polynomial time by iterating over all strategy pairs (s, t) in Γ , of which there are polynomially many, and computing
the outcome u(s, t). Now that we have Γ ∗ written out, we apply Proposition 26 and the claim follows. 
Likewise, we can show that item (2) of Lemma 29 is equivalent to the following condition:
2′. there exists polysized T ′ ⊆ T , s.t. for every polysized S ′ ⊆ S, V (S ′, T ′, u) ≥ v.
The proof of the following lemma runs completely analogous to the proof of Lemma 30 using clause (2′).
Lemma 31. IFε ⊆ ΠP2 .
8. Discussion
In this paper, we outlined the various interpretations that have been given for IF logic.We developed a new interpretation
that is obtained by considering semantic games for IF logic in strategic form Γ (M, ϕ). We applied the notion of equilibrium
to these games to assign a truth value of an IF sentence ϕ on a finite structureM. These efforts yield a truth relationM |Hε ϕ,
which holds iff the value of the equilibrium of the strategic IF game of ϕ on M is at least ε. We saw in Proposition 10
that, for ε = 1, equilibrium semantics coincides with the standard game-theoretic semantics. Theorem 19 implies that
strategic IF games realize precisely the rationals. We derived from this result that, from amodel-theoretic point of view, |Hε
is exchangeable for |Hε′ as long as 0 < ε′ < 1 and ε and ε′ are rationals (Theorem 22). The expressive power of IF logic
under game-theoretic semantics coincides with Σ11 , the existential fragment of second-order logic. By drawing on results
from descriptive complexity theory and combinatorial game theory we showed in Theorem 25 that the expressive power is
bounded byΣ21 ∩Π21 .
In this paper, we only scratched the surface of a number of interesting properties of equilibrium semantics. The first one
is the restriction to finite structures. Every two-player, constant-sum game has an equilibrium if it is finite. If it is infinite this
may not be the case. It would be very interesting to see what strategic IF games Γ (M, ϕ) have equilibriums, for infiniteM.
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We saw that IF logic is at least as expressive asΣ11 under equilibrium semantics and bounded, qua expressive power, by
Σ21 ∩Π21 . The precise expressive power of IF logic under equilibrium semantics is left open. One of the reasons why we find
this problem interesting is that it may turn out that IF logic can express its own complement, that is, for every class STRε(ϕ),
where ϕ is an IF sentence, there is another IF sentence ϕ′ that defines precisely the complement of STRε(ϕ).
After submission, we learned that Galliani [7] devised a strategic approach to IF logic in terms of behavioral strategies. A
behavioral strategy of a player in an extensive game G = G(M, ϕ) can be understood as a probability distribution over the
player’s information sets inG. The truth value of amodel-sentence pair is defined as the value of an equilibrium in behavioral
strategies. Galliani gives a compositional interpretation for this semantic interpretation of IF logic. Galliani independently
shows that precisely the rationals can be realized, using a game that is most similar to the one given in the proof of
Theorem 19. By means of an example, Galliani showed us, in personal communication, that the semantic interpretations
do not coincide.
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